A definition of Swiss neutrality remains elusive, but at least the debate has begun

It was a ferocious battle, hand-to-hand fighting, in which some 20,000 died, a decisive defeat for the Swiss Confederacy by the French and Venetians that in no small measure defined, or confined, its place in Europe. The painful birthplace in 1515 of its neutrality.
The Battle of Marignano was “a symbolic moment, a turning of the tide”, historian Alain-Jacques Czouz-Tornare argues. “Switzerland learned that she could no longer play with the big boys. The expansionist dream, notably in the cantons of central Switzerland, was shattered. 1515 was a saving defeat. It allowed Switzerland to reposition itself according to its natural influence: between the Alps and the Jura, the Rhine and the Rhone.”
It would be a buffer between France and Germany, standing apart, whose accepted non-alignment would spare it from the fights that roiled the continent, although the Swiss would enlist enthusiastically in many armies to fight others’ wars.
Neutrality remains today as deeply embedded in Switzerland’s political culture as it does in Ireland. A referendum would be required to displace it from the constitution, but since 1989, annual surveys by Zurich’s Centre for Security Studies show unwavering support at between 80 and 97 per cent. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, as it has done in Ireland, Sweden and Finland, however, has provoked a profound questioning of what we each mean by the concept, and whether it meets the needs of a radically new and more dangerous security environment.
Switzerland, no less than the rest, is now asking whether its own security would be better protected by a closer alignment with neighbours, specifically the EU and Nato, one based on the demanding obligations of the UN Charter to co-operate in maintaining international security. Significantly, last month, the federal council approved participation in two of the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects, one on military mobility and another on cyberdefence.
On August 29th an expert commission on Swiss defence policy, set up by president and defence minister Viola Amherd, was published to considerable controversy – a “bombshell”, as one paper aptly described it. It strongly backs a continued commitment to neutrality. However, it argues that the concept has to be reframed to make it compatible with today’s threats. It also recommends Switzerland not only strengthen its armed forces but build a closer relationship with and contribution to Nato, though not through full membership. It warns, as others have done of Ireland, that it is seen as a freeloader which assumes it would be defended by European allies if attacked.
Swiss neutrality purists have argued that EU membership is incompatible with neutrality. Only in 2002 did the country become a UN member, after enough of its people were convinced that the organisation had evolved beyond its original victors’ club status to a “true universality” compatible with neutrality.
[ Switzerland walks away from draft treaty with EU after years of talksOpens in new window ]
The report will face a strong pushback in parliament from the left and pacifist wings of the Social Democratic Party and Greens and the far-right Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which already claims that even the observance of international sanctions against Russia is a breach of neutrality.
One of the report’s major preoccupations is the export of Swiss armaments, specifically the constraint or conditionality required by its version of neutrality not to favour either side in a war. It took months of pressure from European allies for Switzerland to agree to the shipping of surplus Leopard tanks, made with Swiss components, to Germany to replace supplies to Ukraine.
Some 14,000 people work in the industry and, as world demand for weapons soared, Swiss arms exports fell last year by a quarter to less than €746 million, in large part because of that strict conditionality. “The re-export ban must be lifted,” the report argues.
That concern for the arms industry also differentiates the neutrality debate from that in Ireland. The Swiss maintain that it is precisely the defence of a neutral state that requires it to maintain a large and heavily equipped army – with mandatory military service for all citizens – against potential threats. Until the late 1960s, Switzerland even contemplated building nuclear weapons – parts of the military believed only a Swiss bomb could uphold the country’s neutrality in the nuclear age.
While it’s unlikely Switzerland will be invaded, the country is already the target of hybrid warfare including disinformation, espionage and cyberattacks, according to the report, which argues that the Russian attack on Ukraine has changed the whole security context. Ukraine has also reframed the discussion in Finland and Sweden, which have for some time renounced the term neutrality for non-alignment and have joined Nato.
Within the EU, Austria has defined its neutrality in yet another way – “engaged neutrality”, a tool of policy, not a principle, and it pragmatically engages with EU defence co-operation but still short of joining a military alliance.
As for Ireland, a common, agreed definition remains elusive, but at last a debate is getting under way about this sacred cow.